jueves, 14 de febrero de 2013

Venezuela: Desde hace un año no permiten acceso de agentes pastorales a cárceles

Venezuela: Desde hace un año no permiten acceso de agentes pastorales a cárceles:

Venezuela: Desde hace un año no permiten acceso de agentes pastorales a cárceles
Venezuela: Desde hace un año no permiten acceso de agentes pastorales a cárceles


CARACAS, 13 Feb. 13 / 08:51 pm (ACI/EWTN Noticias ).- La pastoral penitenciaria de la Iglesia en Venezuela denunció que desde hace un año las autoridades del país no les permiten el acceso a las cárceles, privilegiando la ideologización política por encima de la asistencia religiosa.

Según informó la agencia vaticana Fides, tras el trágico motín en la cárcel de Uribana, el pasado 25 de enero, tanto la Iglesia Católica como los grupos evangélicos denunciaron que las autoridades penitenciarias niegan el acceso a los recintos carcelarios a los voluntarios religiosos.

El Delegado Nacional de la Pastoral Penitenciaria de la Conferencia Episcopal Venezolana (CEV), Padre Ponc Capell Capell, señaló que las autoridades no han dado indicios de querer mantener su compromiso de asistencia religiosa a los reos. Por el contrario, en muchos casos ignoran ese derecho, señaló.

El P. Capell denunció la politización del tema penitenciario, asegurando que se fomenta un voluntariado ideológico en desmedro de la asistencia religiosa.

“Pero nosotros seguiremos trabajando con más ganas y más ilusión porque sabemos que los ministerios pasan, pero la Iglesia queda. Además, siempre habrá gente dispuesta a que las personas sientan la experiencia de Dios y tengan motivación para cambiar" dijo.

Por su parte, María José González, que participa en la dirección de la oficina de Cáritas en Los Teques, atendiendo desde hace seis años la Pastoral Penitenciaria en la región de Miranda, denunció que "desde diciembre de 2011 no entramos formalmente en los recintos penitenciarios, porque tenemos una prohibición expresa del Gobierno”.

“Por eso nuestros voluntarios tienen que ir los días de visita familiar y eso hace que se limite el acompañamiento que usualmente brindábamos a los reclusos y que servía como incentivo para su rehabilitación”, señaló.

Etiquetas: Venezuela, Pastoral penitenciaria, Iglesia en Venezuela


domingo, 3 de febrero de 2013

Venezuela: 14 years under Hugo Frankenchavez

Venezuela: 14 years under Hugo Frankenchavez:


                  




Venezuela has been under the domination of a Venezuelan-Cuban gang of gangsters for the last 14  years and two months. Our country has had bad presidents before but never such a combination of ineptitude, corruption, ideological perversion and abuse of power. I have listed below some  basic information for the use of readers interested in Venezuela. I have separated the information into quantitative and non-quantifiable. Together, they give a good idea of what this regime of gangsters is all about.
                                                           
                   Some important quantitative indices
In 1998 Venezuelan oil exports represented 77 percent of the country’s total exports. Today they represent 96 percent. The country has become more dependent, really totally dependent, on oil. Still worse, in 1998 these exports went to commercial clients who paid cash. Today, about 50 percent of Venezuelan oil exports are not sold commercially but tied to political agreements,  such as the 100,000 barrels per day going to Cuba essentially for free or the 300,000 barrels per day that will be going  to China for the next ten years,  to repay Chinese loans to the Venezuelan government.
II.  In 1998 the Venezuelan national debt was about $34 billion. Today is close to $150 billion, in spite of the fact that the national treasury has received the largest petroleum income in history, some $700 billion during the period. When other income and the loans received are added, the Venezuelan government has received about $1.4 trillion during the period and has very little to show for it.
III. Petroleos de Venezuela, the Venezuelan state oil company produced about 3.3 million barrels per day in 1998. Today it produces anywhere between 2.4 and 2.9 million barrels per day, depending on the source of the information. At this time, if they had executed their five-year plan,  the company should have been producing 5.5 million barrels per day. The company has been forced to partially abandon its core business and now engages in importing and distributing food, building houses and raising pigs, among other non-oil related activities. It has not built one single new refinery or petrochemical installation during these years and sits ineffectively on the largest oil resources of the hemisphere, the Orinoco heavy oil deposits, talking about but not developing them. 
IV. Gasoline and Diesel are now being imported due to the explosion and collapse of the large Amuay refinery, which has been operating at a 60 percent capacity for the last 6 months
V. The labor force of the state oil company has exploded, going from 32,000 employees in 1998 to about 115,000 in 2012, in spite of the forced dismissal of 22,000 technical staff in 2003, after they protested against the politicization of the company at the hands of the regime. The swelling of the labor force has been due to the massive expropriation of companies serving the oil industry and the hiring of their labor, in an effort to asume total  “control” of oil activities.  
VI. The number of private companies active in the country has gone down, from some 14,000 in 1998 to about 9,000 in 2011. Government policy has been to absorb most industrial and commercial activity, an obvious impossibility and one that is driving the Venezuelan economy into the ground. A particularly disastrous example has been the electric sector, which is now generating more electricity with imported diesel, at a large loss to the nation.
VII.Industrial employment in 1998 accounted for 840,000 jobs. In 2011 the number of employees is down to about 540,000
VIII.Whereas expropriations did not take place in Venezuela before 1998, more than one hundred private companies and countless private buildings and farms have been taken over by the government in the last 14 years, while many of the legitimate owners have not received proper or timely compensation.
IX. Public expenditure in 1998 amounted to $21 billion. In 2011 it was $115 billion. However, the large increase went to current, not capital expenditure. Increasing expenditure has  created the  largest  fiscal déficit in history, 18 percent of the GDP in 2012,  and a very high inflation rate.
X. The value of  imports, mostly food, has increased from $17 billion in 1998 to some $50 billion in 2011.
XI. GDP had been growing at a rate of some 10 percent in 1998. In 2009 it had declined to  -4 percent
XII. Direct Foreign Investment went from positive in 1998 to negative in 2011
XIII. In 1998 Venezuelan steel production was about 3.2 million tons but  fell to 1.7 million tons in 2012, the lowest on record. All companies beoning to the state agglomerate CVG: iron, Steel, alumina, aluminum, bauxite, etc, are essentilly bankrupt today and do note ven have money to pay salaries.
XIV.In 1998 there were 3200 murders in the country. In 2011 there were 17,900.
XV.In the last two years 753 prisoners have died violently in Venezuelan prisons, due to the negligence of the government.
XVI.In 1998 there were 16 ministries. In 2011 there were 28 ministries, indicating considerable bureaucratization in the government.
XVII.In 1999 there were 1,395,326 public workers. In 2009 this number had increased to 2,372,587.


                                               


   SOME IMPORTANT, NON-QUANTIFIABLE INDICES.

I.The presidential language/rethoric has deteriorated significantly during these 14 years. Insults have replaced arguments. The majesty of the office does not longer exist
II.Tolerance and respect for political dissidence have dissappeared
III.Class and racial components have been introduced by the government as political weapons
IV.Oil income has been used for handouts to political followers in Venezuela and abroad, in order to keep them loyal to the regime
V.Secrecy dominates the actions of the government. Transparency and accountability do not exist
VI. Undue dependence on Cuban leaders and advisers has weakened Venezuelan sovereignty
VII. Inclusion of the poor has ben done at the expense of exclusion of the middle class
VIII. High levels of corruption permeate the public ranks
IX. Institutions are not autonomous but are under the political control of the Executive
X.The Armed Force has been put to the service of a socialist/militarist political project
XI.The regime has connections with terrorist and drug trafficking organizations worldwide  and withdraws from international organizations that decide or judge against them, such as the Inter American Human Rights Commission and the Center for Arbitration of the World Bank.
XII. Political prisoner rights have been violated systematically. In particular, Judge Afiuni, ordered to prison by Chavez himself, was raped in prison. Even Chavez’s friend Noam Chomsky has publicly called for her release, to no avail. Police Supervisor Simonovis and two of his colleagues remain in prison, sentenced by a politically motivated judge, in need of medical attention that is not given to them.  
XIII. The current provisional government and the situation of president-elect Hugo Chavez have been decided in open violation of the constitution. This government is, in fact, ilegitimate. This is the overwhelming opinion of Venezuelan jurists. President elect Chavez remains in a Havana hospital, true condition unknown since he has not been seen or heard for sixty days. Actions are being taken by the government which are said to derive from his orders but nobody has verified these claims.




                  

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sábado, 2 de febrero de 2013

La agonía de PDVSA

La agonía de PDVSA:
Orlando Ochoa

http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-4O8eL__HE5I/UQrL3oqMu5I/AAAAAAAAIiY/sBOHzU84Da4/s1600/pdvsa_tanquero_hundimiento.jpg
 
Mientras los asuntos políticos y la salud del presidente Chávez envuelven el interés nacional e internacional sobre Venezuela, dos historias en paralelo que afectan la gobernabilidad avanzan: Primero, las graves dificultades económicas del país para enfrentar la falta de suministro de divisas, la presión alcista sobre la cotización de las divisas y la consecuente inflación y escasez. Segundo, los severos problemas financieros de PDVSA.

La petrolera estatal produjo en 2012, según el seguimiento de empresas  internacionales,  2.7 millones b/d de crudo,  más 100.000 b/d de condensados. Una cifra inferior a los 3.5 millones de b/d que señalaba Rafael Ramírez  que se iba a alcanzar en 2012. Las exportaciones fueron de 2.060.000 b/d, la cuales al precio promedio de la canasta venezolana de 2012 de $103,42 el barril, lleva a estimar los ingresos por exportación en $77.760 millones, muy por debajo de los $92.233 millones que indica el BCV en su Informe de fin de año. 

Por otra parte, con el declive continuado de las refinerías por falta de mantenimiento y experticia, las importaciones en 2012 de derivados fueron 151.000 b/d y las de crudo 25.000b/d; a un costo total estimado de $7.500millones. Esta cifra de importaciones de productos y crudo, en nuestra actividad económica dominante, es ahora más del doble de las exportaciones no petroleras reducidas a $3.719mills en 2012, a pesar del Plan Socialista de “desarrollo endógeno”. En realidad la decadencia de PDVSA, al igual que de las empresas básicas de Guayana y las 1.200 empresas estatizadas, tiene como causa la política socialista del siglo XXI.

El problema de PDVSA no termina ahí, que ya sería bastante.  Al pagar con petróleo los prestamos chinos que recibe el Gobierno de Chávez (su único accionista),  además de financiar la factura y acumular cuentas por cobrar de Petrocaribe, sus exportaciones netas se reducen en 25%; y su flujo de caja ya menguado, transfiere otro 25-30% a Fondos extra-presupuestarios de Gobierno. Luego, es incapaz de pagar a proveedores y beneficios a trabajadores, mientras entrega pagarés al Tesoro Nacional; este ente los hace efectivo en el BCV de Merentes, imprimiendo dinero-basura (equivalentes a $38.000 millones) que alimenta la liquidez monetaria,  la inflación y la presión en el mercado cambiario. El país paga las consecuencias.